

# **Monetary Policy and Employment: Do Financial Constraints Matter?**

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**Wake Forest Empirical Macro Workshop**

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# Summary

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- Question: do constrained firms react (adjust employment) more or less in response to monetary policy shock?
- Approach: combine administrative data on Canadian SMEs with survey asking subset of firms about their credit use
  - Predict denial of credit in survey data
  - Use fitted value as proxy for constraint in full data
- Results: constraints **amplify** monetary policy
  - Indirect effect (via constraints) is **29%** of employment response

# Evaluation

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- Overall approach is great
  - Trying to infer financial constraints from firm characteristics or financial conditions is difficult (see e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997)
  - Directly measuring constraints via survey is a big improvement
  - Using fitted values on a larger data set seems right to me
- I think that the share of constrained firms may be biased down
  - Survey question only catches denials, but there are other ways to be constrained
  - Underestimate consistent with some puzzling quantitative results

# Basic idea

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- When choosing how much to borrow, firms set

$$MB(b) = MC(b) = r + \eta$$

where  $b$  is the amount of debt,  $MB$  is marginal benefit, and  $MC$  is marginal cost

- Marginal cost of financing is the interest rate  $r$  plus a **wedge  $\eta$**
- Example: debt  $B$  cannot exceed some constraint  $\bar{B}$ 
  - Unconstrained firms:  $MB(b^*) = r$  implies  $b^* = MB^{-1}(r)$
  - Constrained firms:  $b^* = \bar{b}$
  - Which firm reacts more is **ambiguous** ( $\bar{b}'(r)$  vs.  $(MB^{-1})'(r)$ )

# Survey implementation

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- We want to know if the wedge  $\eta$  exists (or if  $b$  at  $\bar{b}$ )
- Survey not a perfect match for what we need
- What we have:
  - *Did you apply for credit?*
  - *Why did you not apply?*
  - *Were you denied?*
  - *Why were you denied?*
- The ideal question:
  - *If offered additional credit at rate  $r$ , would you have taken it?*

# Measuring constraints

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


- Being denied credit seems sufficient for being constrained
  - But potentially not necessary
- **If credit limits are known, then borrowers can go right up to the limit without being denied**
  - These firms are constrained, but would not count toward  $p$

# Example from the mortgage market



- Right: distribution of LTV ratios on Fannie Mae mortgages
- Most borrowers end up at some institutional limit
  - Appear constrained
- But none of these borrowers are denied



# Measuring constraints

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- Being denied credit seems sufficient for being constrained
  - But potentially not necessary
- If credit limits are known, then borrowers can go right up to the limit without being denied
- **Firms may be constrained by covenants**
  - Covenants on existing debt can effectively limit firm borrowing
  - And can potentially amplify MP transmission (Greenwald 2019)
  - Not clear what firm would answer on survey if this was the case



# Covenants



- Below: evidence from Greenwald (2019) that transmission varies by covenant structure
  - Interest coverage covenants very sensitive to interest rates




Figure 5: Estimated Response to Interest Rate ↓ 100bp by Covenant

# Measuring constraints

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
- Being denied credit seems sufficient for being constrained
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- If credit limits are known, then borrowers can go right up to the limit without being denied
- Firms may be constrained by covenants
- **Firms may face upward sloping interest rate schedule**
  - Mechanism in Ottonello and Winberry (2020), BGG (1999), etc.
  - Firm is not literally constrained on quantity, but stops borrowing because of rising spreads

# Upward sloping supply



- Below: plot from Ottonello and Winberry (2020)
- Upward sloping credit supply (marginal cost) as firm levers up can behave like constraint (via  $\eta$ )

FIGURE 2: Response to Monetary Policy for Risk-Free and Risky Firms



# Regression magnitudes



- Authors predict denial of credit using linear prediction model (OLS)
- Resulting fitted value  $\hat{p}$  is the proxy for being financially constrained
- Missing values (firm is constrained but we measure  $p = 0$ ) will attenuate coefficients

Table 6: Determinants of credit constraints

Predictive variables	Coefficient	Standard error
Total liabilities	0.0136***	0.0026
Current liabilities	0.0058**	0.0025
Total assets	-0.0112***	0.0031
Current assets	-0.0061**	0.0026
Revenue	-0.0236***	0.0073
Expense	0.0138*	0.0070
Age	-0.0080***	0.0020
Constant	0.0387***	0.0018

# Regression magnitudes

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- Regression magnitudes seem consistent with underestimate of constrained share (or else are puzzling)
- Example: let's double firm debt
  - Typical firm has ~50% leverage, so this is a big deal
  - Equivalent to adding 0.69 to log liabilities
  - Increases  $\hat{p}$  by  $0.0136 \times 0.69 = 0.94\%$
  - For average firm, increases  $\hat{p}$  from 2.1% to just 3.04%
- Impact seems attenuated, possibly because truly constrained firms are appearing as zeros on the LHS

# Monetary policy magnitudes



- Main regression (simplified):

$$\bar{l}_{i,t} = \mu_{j,m} + \dots + \underbrace{\beta_d \varepsilon_t + \theta'_d z_{i,t} \varepsilon_t}_{\text{direct effect}} + \underbrace{\beta_{id} \hat{p}_{i,t} \varepsilon_t}_{\text{indirect effect}} + u_t$$

- Employment response: **direct effect (71%)**, **indirect effect (29%)**
- Back of the envelope math (let's say employment moves by 1%)
  - Indirect effect of 0.29% is  $\bar{p}$  x (response if constrained)
  - $\bar{p}$  is small (2.1%), so conditional response is huge
  - Constrained firms cut employment by extra **13.8%** after 25bp shock

# Conclusion

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- Great methodology for measuring effect of financial constraints
  - Instead of guessing, let's ask firms!
  - Then create index for non-surveyed firms
- Survey design probably leads to **underestimates of constrained**
  - Index still seems valuable (similar to e.g., Whited-Wu)
  - But other magnitudes affected by bias (e.g., employment response of constrained to monetary policy)
- No reason to stop at monetary policy
  - Lots of interesting (and more powerful) shocks to investigate using this great data set!