Interest Rate Risk and Household Portfolios

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Introduction



• Summary:

- Question: how do households manage interest rate risk?
- Approach: model of optimal interest rate hedging using bonds
 - Carefully account for labor income risk, social security
- Main result: empirical interest rate exposures close to optimal!

• This discussion:

- Background: duration and hedging
- This paper's mechanism: why don't households fully hedge?
- Comments and suggestions

3

Background: household interest rate exposure

• Financial wealth equals PV of excess consumption:

$$\underbrace{\theta_0}_{\text{financial wealth}} = \underbrace{E_0 \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} R^{-t} (c_t - y_t)}_{\text{PV of excess consumption}}$$

- If durations (exposures) of financial wealth and PV of excess consumption match → perfect hedging
 - Old consumption path exactly feasible following small change in R
- Duration mismatch \rightarrow consumption possibilities change with *R*



Background: household interest rate exposure



4


- Young typically have very long durations of excess consumption
 - Plan to save in middle age, dissave in retirement
- Three-period example: 35-year old with Year 0 wealth θ_0
 - Middle age (Year 20): save \$200k
 - Old (Year 40): consume \$800k
- If r = 5%: $\theta_0 = -1.05^{-20} \times \$200k + 1.05^{-40} \times \$800k = \$38.3k$
- Duration of excess consumption:

$$D^{c-y} = -\frac{1.05^{-20} \times \$200k}{\$38.3k} \times 20 + \frac{1.05^{-40} \times \$800k}{\$38.3k} \times 40 = 79.4$$

Background: household interest rate exposure



- **Greenwald et al (GLVN):** empirical durations of the young + less wealthy are not high enough to insure consumption possibilities
 - Budget set contracts when interest rates fall



Background: household interest rate exposure



- Top-10% financial wealth share rose by 8.3pp from 1983 to 2019
 GLVN: falling rates + heterogeneous durations explains ~ all of it
- Under perfect hedging, share would have needed to fall by 3.1pp
 - Mostly due to large financial wealth gains to low-wealth young
 - Implies large real consumption consequences to underhedging
- In contrast, this paper finds household portfolios \sim optimal
 - Not because our quantitative implications disagree
 - Instead, because it is optimal not to perfectly hedge
 - True even though hedging is costless. Why?



- Imagine there is a machine that turns tokens into cookies
 - Good state (50% probability): each token creates three cookies
 - Bad state (50% probability): each token creates one cookie
- How do you allocate 100 tokens across the two states?
 - Infinitely risk-averse: send 75 tokens to bad state, 25 to good state to ensure consumption of 75 in each state
 - Risk-neutral: send all tokens to good state
 - Finitely risk-averse: send some tokens to both states, with higher consumption in the good state
- Idea: want more tokens where the machine is more productive

Intuition: optimal hedging



- This is essentially what is going on in the model
 - Under high rates, assets create more future consumption
 - Under low rates, assets create less future consumption
- Want to tilt resources to high-rate state, consume more there
 - This means that you do not fully hedge interest rate risk
 - Instead, consumption possibilities under optimal hedging will expand when rates rise and contract when rates fall
- Young make larger bets (hedge less) than old
 - Difference in "productivity" of assets across high-rate, low-rate states is larger with more time to compound

Comment 1: risk aversion

- Results are highly dependent on risk aversion (γ)
 - For $\gamma \rightarrow \infty$, optimal to hedge perfectly
 - For $\gamma = 1$, optimal to hold only short-term bond
 - For $\gamma \rightarrow 0$, optimal to go infinitely long on short-term bond, infinitely short on long-term bond
- Implies that we can rationalize basically any observed behavior using the right level of γ
- The paper uses $\gamma = 5$, which is a reasonable baseline
 - But would really help to see robustness to this parameter



Comment 2: why is the rate moving?



- Conclusions about hedging depend on why interest rate moves
 - This paper: exogenous variation unrelated to saving demand
 - In this case, lower returns under low rates are a pure loss
- Alternative story: rates fell because discount factor rose (β \uparrow)
 - Conjecture: would now be optimal to fully hedge
 - Higher value of future consumption offsets lower return
- Other proposed mechanisms also encourage more hedging
 - Slowdown in growth increases future marginal utility
 - So does increase in uncertainty (in expectation)

Comment 3: optimality or coincidence?




- Authors' story: households solved the optimal hedging problem
 - Decided to partially hedge interest rate risk, reserve more resources for high-rate states when yields are high
- Alternative story: near-optimal hedging is a coincidence
 - Balance sheet of typical household dominated by house, mortgage
 - Little other participation in financial markets
 - Combined with social security, happens to have right duration
- Would not overturn results, but important policy consideration
 - Policies like social security may help households manage risk
 - Optimal policy may depend strongly on risk aversion

Source: Greenwald, Leombroni, Lustig, Van Nieuwerburgh (2023)

Comment 4: what about future cohorts?

- GLVN analyze welfare gains/losses from fall in rates since 1980s
 - Cohorts born before 1960 gain
 - Cohorts born after 1960 lose
- This paper: losses for younger cohorts were ex-ante optimal
- But cohorts entering the market after rates fell also lost
 - Face challenges accumulating wealth, generating income in retirement
 - Should policy be hedging on behalf of the unborn?

<u>PV Consumption Relative</u> to Steady State (GLVN)





Conclusion



- Very interesting, well-executed paper
- Mechanism: optimal interest rate hedging trades off higher productivity in high-rate states against risk aversion
 - Households do not fully hedge, particularly the young
 - Consumption opportunities contract when rates fall
- My comments:
 - 1. Robustness to risk aversion (γ)
 - 2. How does the cause of rate change influence results?
 - 3. Is near-optimality a choice or coincidence?
 - 4. How should policy treat future cohorts?